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Abstract
Disinflation is a painful exercise: it reduces output and increases unemployment at least in 
the short run. This paper analyses the effects of adopting inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy framework in order to reduce inflation and maintain it at a low level, on this output 
or employment sacrifice. Using OECD data for several countries and several empirical 
methodologies, sacrifice ratios are measured. Several important results emerge: first, 
adopting of inflation targeting has not been an overnight shift but a gradual process; 
second, in industrial countries, inflation targeting has resulted in lower inflation as well 
as lower unemployment; however, the experience of some Eurozone economies as well as 
emerging market inflation targeters show that maintaining low and stable inflation could 
lead to adverse unemployment outcomes. 
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1.  Introduction
There s a broad consensus that the central focus of monetary polcy should be the mantenance of low and 
stable nflaton. Ths does not, however, mean that central banks need not consder any other economc 
objectves, a fact recognsed by both modern theory and practce of monetary polcy. The most accepted 
theoretcal formulatons of central bank objectve functons and monetary polcy reacton functons feature 
the stablzaton of prces/nflaton and at least one other (usually output or employment related) economc 
varable. On the other hand, n practce, even the most respected nflaton targetng regmes make an allowance 
for the polcy maker to consder the effects of hs/her decsons on other economc varables. 
The objectve of ths paper s to dscuss the trade-off arsng from pursng multple objectves n central 
bankng and the costs assocated wth dsnflaton arsng from ths trade-off. To these ends, I start by brefly 
dscussng the hstorcal fndngs about the trade-off between prces and output/employment, and show that 
ths trade-off s stll vald n monetary polcy debates. I then dscuss the lterature on costs of dsnflaton 
and sacrfce ratos. Fnally, I embark on an emprcal analyss to measure the output/employment sacrfce 
made by central banks n reducng nflaton n general and adoptng and mantanng an nflaton target n 
partcular, and to dentfy whether the adopton of nflaton targetng by central banks has had any mpact on 
ths trade-off.  
2. The Inflation-unemployment Trade-off 
The trade-off between nflaton and real varables such as output and employment s a long-dscussed topc 
n monetary economcs. Accordng the Mankw (2000), “[t]he nflaton-unemployment trade-off s, at ts 
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heart, a statement about the effects of monetary polcy. It s the clam that changes n monetary polcy push 
these two varables n opposte drectons” (p.2). Most nfluental early work on ths trade-off, later to be 
known as the Phllps curve relatonshp, was carred out by Phllps (1958), Lpsey (1960), and Samuelson 
and Solow (1960), who dsplayed the exstence of a trade-off between nflaton and unemployment for the 
UK and the USA. Ths was followed by the contrbutons of Fredman (1968) and Phelps (1968) who showed 
that ths trade-off s a short-run relatonshp whch occurs when actual nflaton devates from expected 
nflaton, whle n the long run, when actual nflaton equals expected nflaton, ths relatonshp s vertcal 
at the natural rate of unemployment. As summarsed by Taylor (1998), today “there s substantal theoretcal 
support and emprcal evdence demonstratng that there s no long-run trade-off between the level of nflaton 
and the level of unused resources n the economy – whether measured by the unemployment rate, the capacty 
utlzaton rate, or the devaton of real GDP from potental GDP. Monetary polcy s thus neutral n the long 
run: An ncrease n money growth wll have no long-run mpact on the unemployment rate; t wll only result 
n an ncrease n the nflaton rate. The average level of unemployment – or the natural rate – s not a constant, 
however; t can be affected by government polces, but these are mcroeconomc rather than monetary n 
nature” and that “there s also substantal theoretcal support and emprcal evdence of short-run monetary 
non-neutralty” (pp.29-30).
The above confrms that although t s a very much accepted fact that a central bank should prmarly focus 
on mantanng prce stablty, theoretcally as well as n practce t s also accepted that a central bank should 
consder the effects of ts polcy on other economc varables at least n the short-run.
2.1. The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-off in Theory of Monetary Policy
In theorsng monetary polcy, a model requres a central bank objectve functon or a loss functon. A modern-
day objectve/loss functon of a central bank nvolves objectves such as output/unemployment stablsaton 
n addton to prce stablty. Walsh (2003) confrms ths: “[]t s standard to assume that the central bank’s 
objectve functon nvolves output (or employment) and nflaton” (p.366). An example of a standard central 
bank objectve functon nvolvng nflaton and unemployment can be wrtten down as follows:
max    (1)
where the objectve of the central bank s to maxmsed the expected value of the functon gven by 
equation 1, where π  is inflation,  u s unemployment, un  is the natural rate of unemployment, and  λ is the 
polcy weght gven to devatons of unemployment from ts natural rate. As a central bank loss functon, ths 
can be equvalently wrtten as 
mn.   (2)
where the central bank attempts to mnmse the loss arsng from devatons from nflaton and 
employment objectves. Another common example of a loss functon s
mn.   (3)
where both the nflaton objectve as well as the unemployment objectve enters the central bank loss functon 
quadratcally (.e., hgher the devaton of the objectve from ts natural rate or the target, the hgher s the 
loss). In ths specfc example where c  s a postve constant, n addton to the nflaton objectve, the central 
bank also ams to push unemployment below the natural rate of unemployment by an amount of c.
Some researchers also nclude nterest rate stablsaton and exchange rate stablsaton n central bank 
objectve/loss functons, but some argue that these are nstruments or ntermedate targets, and therefore, 
should not be ncluded as an end objectve of a central bank (see, for nstance, Cecchett and Ehrmann 
(1999)). Also, Cecchett, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2006), who use a standard loss functon as above, 
state that ther assumpton that “the fundamental concern of a central bank s domestc macroeconomc 
performance as measured by output and prce stablty” (p.19) does not warrant the ncluson of the nterest 
rate or the exchange rate n the loss functon.
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Svensson (1997), who dscusses theorsng nflaton targetng also utlse a quadratc loss functon n the form of  
 ()
and defnes an nflaton targetng regme as “wth an assgned loss functon   wth the 
three parameters:  , an explct announced nflaton target;  , an mplct but known employment target; 
and  , an mplct but known relatve weght on employment stablzaton” (p.99).  
Agan, n theory, when modellng central bank reacton functons, one ncludes central bank reacton to 
nflaton as well as to real varables such as output or unemployment. The most popular example of ths type 
of reacton functons s the Taylor rule, whch takes the followng form:
  (5)
 where the central bank reacts to devatons of nflaton from ts target and output gap by changng ts 
polcy nstrument, the nterest rate (   ). Here   s the equlbrum nterest rate,   s the nflaton target, 
  s the output gap,   s the polcy weght gven to output gap stablsaton and   s the polcy weght 
gven to nflaton stablsaton.1 
2.2. The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-off in Practical Monetary 
Policymaking
In practce, even the strngent nflaton targetng regmes have provsons for flexblty, whch are usually 
ncorporated n order to avod excessve adverse pressure on other macroeconomc varables. Svensson (1997) 
argues that “[t]he nterpretaton of nflaton-targetng regmes as havng a loss functon nvolvng both nflaton 
and unemployment targets s supported by several crcumstances” (p.100).  Ths s confrmed by Lederman 
and Svensson (1995), and Bernanke and Mshkn (1997), among others. Accordng to Bernanke and Mshkn 
(1997), “[d]espte the language referrng to nflaton control as the prmary objectve of monetary polcy, 
[…] nflaton-targetng central banks always make room for short-run stablzaton objectves, partcularly 
wth respect to output and exchange rates” (p.101). These authors show several features of nflaton targetng 
regmes to support ther argument:
1. Accordng to Svensson (1997), most nflaton targetng regmes specfy tolerance bands around 
the nflaton target “ndcatng that some varablty of nflaton around the target s acceptable” 
(p.100). Ths s nterpreted as a provson for short-run flexblty n monetary polcy decsons. 
For nstance, Bernanke and Mshkn (1997) show that “the use of ranges generally reflect not 
only uncertanty about the lnk between polcy levers and nflaton outcomes but s also ntended 
to allow the central bank some flexblty n the short run” (p.101).
2. Svensson (1997) shows that “[n]o central bank wth an explct nflaton target seems to behave 
as f t wshes to acheve the target at all cost, regardless of the employment consequences.[…] 
A promnent central banker, Mervyn Kng (1995), has nterpreted nflaton-targetng regmes 
precsely n ths way. Thus, an nflaton-targetng regme s not nterpreted as correspondng to 
, what Kng (1995) calls the case of an “nflaton nutter”(p.100).
3. Bernanke and Mshkn (1997) also argue that “the prce ndex on whch the offcal nflaton 
targets are based s often defned to exclude or down-weght the effects of “supply shocks;” for 
example, the offcally targeted prce ndex may exclude some combnaton of food and energy 
prces, ndrect tax changes, terms-of-trade shocks, and the drect effects of nterest rate changes 
on the ndex” (p.101).
. Accordng to Bernanke and Mshkn (1997), “short-term nflaton targets can and have been 
1/ For simplicity, discussions of the importance of expectations and forward or lagged variables, as well as modern-day 
Phillips curves are avoided.
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adjusted to accommodate supply shocks or other exogenous changes n the nflaton rate outsde 
the central banks control” (p.101).
5. Bernanke and Mshkn also show that nflaton targetng regmes comprse explct “escape 
clauses” permttng the government or the central bank to suspend or modfy the nflaton target 
“n the face of certan adverse economc developments” (p.101). However, as Svensson (1997) 
shows  “[a]n nflaton-targetng regme need not have explct escape clauses for supply shocks 
n order to ncorporate some preference for employment stablzaton (p.100).
The above dscusson dsplays that nflaton-output/unemployment trade-off s stll an mportant element 
n theoretcal debates as well as practcal aspects of monetary polcy and central bankng. As Solow (1998) 
states “monetary polcy could afford to go n for a tral-and-error approach to fndng a far balance between 
the dangers of nflaton and the benefts of hgh output and employment” (pp.-5). However, as long as 
the prme objectve of a central bank remans the mantenance of prce stablty, a central bank would want 
to mantan nflaton at a desred low level. In most occasons, central banks have faced the challenge of 
reducng nflaton to that desred low level pror to embarkng on the task of mantanng prce/nflaton 
stablty. The need to reduce nflaton, coupled wth the exstence of a trade-off between nflaton and output/
unemployment gve rse to the concept “cost of dsnflaton”.
3. Costs of Disinflation and Sacrifice Ratios
Accordng to Mayes and Chapple (199), “[o]ne of the major concerns of monetary polcy s that the cost of 
brngng nflaton down may be hgh n terms of unemployment and n output foregone. It s obvous why 
governments wsh to reduce nflaton n the frst place, because nflaton tself tends to contrbute to a lower 
rate of economc growth and ncrease socal nequalty” (p.9). 
The lterature on the costs of dsnflaton s manly three-fold. Frst, there s a debate as to whether dsnflaton 
should be a gradual process or a qucker change. As Cecchett and Rch (2001) show “[s]ome dscussons, 
ncludng those of Okun (1978), Gorden and Kng (1982), Taylor (1983), Sargent (1983), Andersen (1992), 
and Ball (199), have focused on the speed of dsnflaton and whether the monetary authorty should adopt 
a gradualst approach or subject the economy to a “cold turkey” remedy” (p.17). Researchers who favour 
gradualsm wth regard to dsnflaton nclude Taylor (1983), whle Sargent (1983) and Ball (1993) argue that 
gradualsm makes dsnflaton more expensve.  
Second, some researchers attempt to dentfy factors that help to reduce the cost of dsnflaton. Cecchett and 
Rch (2001) show that  Ball, Mankw, and Romer (1988) analyse the mplcatons of the level of nflaton, 
Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983) study the degree of nomnal wage rgdty, and Jordan (1999) analyse 
the extent of central bank ndependence, as cost-reducng strateges of dsnflatonary polces. Walsh (2003) 
observes that “credble polcy to reduce nflaton should succeed n actually reducng nflaton wthout 
causng a recesson. Ths mplcaton contrasts sharply wth the vew that any polcy desgned to reduce 
nflaton would succeed only by nducng an economc slowdown and temporarly hgher unemployment and 
provdes an example from Sargent (1986) who examnes the ends of several post World War I hypernflatons 
n Austra, Germany, Hungary, and Poland and concludes that ““Whle unemployment dd rse durng the 
prce stablzaton, Sargent concluded that the output cost “was mnor compared wth the $220 bllon GNP 
that some current analysts estmate would be lost n the Unted States per one percentage pont nflaton 
reducton” (Sargent 1986, p.55)” (p.39).
The thrd type of related lterature focuses on measurng the cost of dsnflaton. There are several methods 
of estmatng the costs of dsnflaton, whch s commonly known as the “sacrfce ratos”. The standard 
defnton for sacrfce rato s from Okun (1978), whch s “[f]or an extra percentage pont of unemployment 
mantaned for a year, the estmated reducton n the ultmate nflaton rate at equlbrum unemployment 
ranges between one-sxth and one-half of 1 percentage pont, wth and average estmate of 0.3” (p.38). 
Accordng to Andersen and Wascher (1999), Okun’s defnton mples three features of the sacrfce rato: 
“() the costs of dsnflaton refer to a permanent reducton of nflaton and not just a temporary one; () the 
costs are calculated as the cumulatve losses durng the perod of dsnflaton; and () the losses are usually 
calculated for a one pont reducton n the rate of nflaton and can be expressed n terms of ether output or 
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unemployment, wth the coeffcent from the Okun equaton (see Okun (1962)) brdgng the two” (p.2). Other 
defntons nclude Cecchett and Rch (2001) (“The sacrfce rato s the cumulatve loss n output, measured 
as a percent of one year’s gross domestc product (GDP), resultng from a one percentage-pont permanent 
reducton n nflaton” (p.16)), and Cukerman (2002) (“The sacrfce rato s the cumulatve ncrease n the 
yearly rate of unemployment that s due to the dsnflaton effort dvded by the total decrease n the rate of 
nflaton” (p.1)). 
Ball (1993) argues that although dervng the [sacrfce] rato from an estmated Phllps curve as suggested by 
Okun (1978), or Gordon and Kng (1982) s common, “[a] lmtaton of ths approach s that t constrans the 
output-nflaton trade-off to be the same durng dsnflatons as durng ncreases n trend nflaton or temporary 
fluctuatons n demand” (p.3). The approach of calculatng sacrfce ratos as suggested by Anderson (1992), 
Ball (1993, 199), and Anderson and Wascher (1999) s to calculate sacrfce ratos from actual developments 
n nflaton, output, and unemployment durng ndvdual epsodes of dsnflaton. As Hutchson and Walsh 
(1998) show, ths approach “depends upon assumpton about what consttutes a dsnflaton ‘epsode’ and 
how to determne equlbrum output levels. Also, t focuses entrely on dsnflatonary perods rather than on 
both dsnflaton and nflaton epsodes. Equally mportant, no control s made for other polces or shocks 
to supply whch may smultaneously affect the state of the busness cycle and the rate of nflaton” (p.711). 
Also as Mayes and Chapple (199) show, “the computaton of these ratos s no trval matter. Inflaton may 
fall over a perod when output also falls (or at least output growth slows) but t s not clear how much of that 
change, f any, s due to the polcy measures employed to acheve t. They may have been neffectve or even 
counter-productve and the prncpal cause of the dsnflaton may le elsewhere” (p.12). Cukerman (2002) 
also concur: “Ideally, one would have lked to obtan a “net” measure of the addtonal unemployment that 
s due only to the monetary dsnflaton polcy and to relate t to the addtonal reducton n nflaton because 
of that polcy. Exstng measures of sacrfce ratos lump these two components together provdng “gross” 
rather than (more relevant) “net” measures of sacrfce ratos” (p.18). 
Other methods of computng the sacrfce rato also exst. Cecchett and Rch (1999) and Kng and Watson 
(199) estmate sacrfce ratons usng structural VAR models, but they fnd that the ratos obtaned are 
hghly senstve to the sze of the model and the dentfcaton restrctons used. 
Apart from the tradtonal approach of measurng cost of dsnflaton n terms of output or employment, 
several artcles startng from Taylor (1979), hghlght a trade-off between the varablty of nflaton and 
the varablty of output.  Usng ths approach, Taylor (1979) shows that “[a]lthough there s no long run 
trade-off between the level of nflaton and the level of output, there does exst a second order Phllps curve 
trade-off between fluctuatons n output and fluctuatons n nflaton whch s not vertcal n the long run. Ths 
trade-off was estmated for the U.S. economy over the 1953-1975 perod and s downward slopng: over the 
relevant range of ths curve busness cycle fluctuatons can be reduced only by ncreasng the varablty of 
nflaton” (p.128). As Fuhrer (1997), Cecchett, Flores-Lagunes and Krause ((2006), among others, show 
that when the central bank loss functon s wrtten smlar to equaton () above, the objectve of the central 
bank s to mnmze the devatons from target nflaton and target output or employment. Taylor (1998) 
further descrbes ths trade-off presents yet another choce to polcymakers. If the economy s already on the 
effcency fronter, “they must choose a polcy rule that takes a poston on the mportance of one measure of 
stablty versus the other” (p.1).  
4. Inflation Targeting and Cost of Disinflation
The concepts of the cost of dsnflaton and sacrfce ratos are partcularly mportant to the current monetary 
polcy debates because several countres have adopted nflaton targetng as a vable monetary polcy 
framework to reduce nflaton and mantan nflaton at a low level, but ts mpact on output and employment 
has not been fully tested. As Clfton, Leon, and Wong (2001) note, “the wdespread adopton of Inflaton 
targetng (IT) has been partly due to the percepton that the IT countres have been successful at reducng 
nflaton wth a relatvely lower cost of foregone output compared to non-IT countres” (p.3). The exstng 
lterature on nflaton targetng and the cost of dsnflaton have stll not reached a consensus wth ths regard. 
The studes that show that nflaton targetng has reduced the cost of dsnflaton nclude, Clfton, Leon, and 
Wong (2001) who nvestgate seven OECD nflaton targeters and nne OECD countres that have not adopted 
Have the Sacrifice Ratios Changed under Inflation Targeting? - An Empirical Investigation
78
“Central Banking and Financial Markets” Central Bank of Sri Lanka Inaugural International Research Conference
nflaton targetng and conclude that “the adopton of nflaton targetng may ndeed help to mprove the 
unemployment-nflaton trade-off, there s nothng to suggest that nflaton targetng s unque n ths regard” 
(p.6), Corbo, Monero and Schmdt-Hebbel (2000) who study 9 nflaton targetng countres and 16 other 
countres and conclude that nflaton targetng may have lowered the output costs of nflaton stablzaton, 
and Andersen and Wascher (1999) who study 19 ndustral countres and observe that  n countres that had 
adopted nflaton targetng have smaller sacrfce ratos. 
In contrast, studes ncludng Bernanke, Laubach, Mshkn, and Posen (1999), do not fnd that nflaton 
targetng had a sgnfcant mpact on the output-nflaton trade-off, whle Ball and Sherdan (2003), who also 
compare economc performance n 7 OECD nflaton targeters and 13 non targeters fnd no evdence that 
nflaton targetng mproves a country’s economc performance wth regard to the nflaton-output trade-off, 
whch they argue, s possbly because both sets of countres they analyse pursued smlar nterest rate polces. 
Lundborg and Sacklen (2006) who use Swedsh data show that “heavy ant-nflatonary polces mght have 
caused unemployment to persst at hgh levels” and n the case of Sweden “[r]asng the Swedsh nflaton 
target from 2 to  percent would brng long-run unemployment down by several percentage ponts” (p.13). 
As shown by Clfton, Leon, and Wong (2001), for developng countres and emergng market countres, 
the fndngs may not be smlar to those for OECD countres: “An unanswered queston s whether nflaton 
targetng would be a successful strategy for countres startng wth nflaton sgnfcantly above OECD 
levels, even f t s correct that nflaton targetng mproved the unemployment-nflaton trade-off n a group 
of OECD countres that already had relatvely low nflaton by emergng market standards. As explored by 
Khan and Senhadj (2000), the relatonshp between growth and nflaton may be substantally dfferent n 
developng and ndustral countres, .e., negatve effects of nflaton on growth may set n at a substantally 
hgher nflaton threshold n developng countres” (p.19). Gonçalves and Salles (2008), who use data for 36 
developng economes, 13 of whch have mplemented the nflaton targetng framework fnd that “the choce 
of the IT regme proved benefcal for emergng economes. In partcular, we fnd that: () the greater fall n 
nflaton experenced by emergng market targeters can, to some extent, be attrbuted to the regme tself and 
not only to mean reverson; () those choosng to nflaton target saw a greater reducton n growth volatlty 
than those optng for alternatve monetary polcy arrangements (lendng some credence to the often asserted 
“flexblty to cope wth shocks” characterstc of the regme). Moreover, the often heard clam that nflaton 
targetng regmes hnder economc growth s clearly not sustaned by the emprcal evdence. In sum, the 
data so far suggests that the adopton of IT by emergng economes dd contrbute towards the attanment of 
superor outcomes n terms of economc performance” (pp.317-8). 
Any favourable change n the nflaton-unemployment trade-off under nflaton-targetng s sad to arse from 
the credblty of monetary polcy generally assocated wth nflaton targetng. Clfton, Leon, and Wong 
(2001) show that “[s]trengthenng the credblty of monetary polcy s generally seen n the lterature as a 
development that should mprove the unemployment-nflaton trade-off snce a gven change n nflaton 
would be assocated wth a smaller change n unemployment” and summarse Clarda, Gal, and Gertler’s 
(1999) argument that “f prce-settng behavor depends on forward-lookng expectatons, then a central bank 
that can credbly commt to an nflaton-fghtng rule faces an mproved short run trade-off between nflaton 
and unemployment. They note that nflaton targetng can be vewed as a transparent way for a central bank 
to put relatvely greater weght on fghtng nflaton n ther polcy loss functon. The smple explanaton for 
ths result s that a central bank that agents beleve wll be an nflaton hawk n the future and wll not have to 
contract output by as much today to acheve a gven dsnflaton” (p.). However, as Clfton, Leon, and Wong 
(2001) show, the relatonshp between credblty of monetary polcy and the nflaton-unemployment trade-
off are far from clear due to other complcatons. Other studes that argue that monetary polcy credblty can 
reduce the nflaton-unemployment trade-off nclude Corbo, Moreno, and Schmdt-Hebbel (2000), Cecchett 
and Km (2003), and Cecchett, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006). 
Havng revewed some recent lterature on the exstence of the nflaton-output/unemployment trade-off, 
costs assocated wth dsnflaton and estmatng sacrfce ratos, and the relatonshp between nflaton 
targetng and the nflaton-output/unemployment trade-off, an emprcal nvestgaton wll be conducted 
usng several developed and emergng market countres to dentfy any regulartes wth regard to dsnflaton 
under nflaton targetng and ts mpact on unemployment. The choce of countres n the sample s purely 
based on consstent and hstorcal data avalablty.
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5. Empirical Evidence
The emprcal analyss utlzes four sub-samples of countres as shown n Table 1. The frst two sub-samples 
represent countres that have explctly adopted nflaton targetng as the monetary polcy framework, whle 
the latter two sub-samples consst of comparator countres. The data are obtaned from OECD Key Economc 
Indcators and generally cover the perod from 1980Q1 to 2007Q1. Where there are gaps n data seres, data 
from IMF Internatonal Fnancal Statstcs are used. Also, quarterly data are not always readly avalable. 
In such nstances, annual data seres are nterpolated usng the Goldsten and Khan (1976) method to obtan 
requred quarterly data.
Table 1: Sub-samples used in the Analysis
Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 Sub-sample 3 Sub-sample 4
Inflation Targeters  –   
Industrial Countries
Inflation Targeters – 
Emerging Market Countries
EURO Zone Other Non- Inflation 
Targeting Countries
Australia Brazil Austria Denmark
Canada Czech Republic Belgium Japan
Finland Hungary Finland Russia
Iceland Republic of Korea France Switzerland
Norway Mexico Germany USA
New Zealand Poland Greece
Spain Slovak Republic Ireland
Sweden Turkey Italy
UK Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Note: Finland and Spain are considered inflation targeters only up to 1998Q4.
5.1. Sub-Sample 1: Inflation Targeters – Industrial countries 
5.1.1. Measuring the trade-off
a. Correlation between Inflation and Unemployment
Table 2 provdes the coeffcents of correlaton between nflaton and unemployment before and after 
adoptng nflaton targetng n countres n sub-sample 1 (.e., Australa, Canada, Fnland, Iceland, Norway, 
New Zealand, Span, Sweden, UK). All countres n the sub-sample dsplay a trade-off between nflaton 
and unemployment as shown by negatve coeffcents of correlaton averagng about 0.7.  The correlaton 
weakens followng the adopton of nflaton targetng ndcatng a possble lessenng of the trade-off between 
nflaton and unemployment. In Span and the UK, the coeffcent of correlaton become postve followng 
the adopton of nflaton targetng, sgnalng that there s no trade-off between nflaton and unemployment. 
The excepton s Australa where the coeffcent of correlaton remans almost unchanged durng the two 
sub-perods.  
Table 2: Coefficients of Correlation : Inflation and Unemployment
Country Before IT After IT
Australia -0.1578 -0.1857
Canada -0.3300 -0.1224
Finland -0.3253 -0.1466
Iceland -0.6029 -0.5455
Norway -0.6905 -0.0295
New Zealand -0.5639 -0.2692
Spain -0.5724 0.6508
Sweden -0.3803 -0.0979
UK -0.6017 0.3789
Average -0.4694 -0.0408
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Aggregated nflaton and unemployment for the countres n ths sub-sample 2 quarters before and after 
adoptng nflaton targetng are shown n Fgure 1. The methodology used n the aggregaton s Smlar to 
Clfton, Leon, and Wong (2001), where T s the quarter n whch the country adopted nflaton targetng. 
The two trend seres, of nflaton (HPDLCPI) and of unemployment (HPU) are obtaned usng the Hodrck-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter λ = 1,600. 
The trade-off between nflaton and unemployment s clearly vsble durng the 2-quarter perod pror to 
adoptng nflaton targetng by the countres n sub-sample 1. The trade-off contnues durng the frst 8 
quarters followng the ntroducton of nflaton targetng, before t lessens afterwards wth unemployment 
declnng whle nflaton remanng relatvely unchanged.  
b. Structural Breaks in Inflation and Unemployment following Inflation Targeting
Table 3 nvestgates whether average nflaton and unemployment have changed durng the two sub-
perods. In all countres n the sub-sample, mean nflaton has declned by around 1.5 percentage ponts 
(and around 73 per cent) on average for perod followng the ntroducton of nflaton targetng. However, 
wth regard to unemployment, the experences vary; adoptng nflaton targetng s assocated wth reduced 
mean unemployment only n Australa, Canada, Iceland and the UK; n Fnland, New Zealand, Span and 
Sweden, average unemployment has ncreased sgnfcantly after the ntroducton of nflaton targetng. 
However, on average, whle there s a 73 per cent declne n nflaton, there has only been a 20 per cent rse 
n unemployment. 
Quarterly Inflation and Unemployment - Before and After IT
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Figure 1: Aggregated Data – Sub-sample 1
Notes: 
1. DLCPI (Left axis)  is the average inflation for the 9 countries in the sub-sample.
2. U (Right axis) is the average unemployment for the same 9 countries.
3. Since Finland and Spain joined EU in 1999Q1, the data for these countries are used only up to 
1998Q4; i.e., Finland up to T+22 and Spain up to T+16.
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Table 3: Inflation and Unemployment Rate
Country Inflation (Per cent) Unemployment (Per cent)
Before IT After IT % Change Before IT After IT % Change
Australia 1.69 0.64 -62.13 7.86 7.03 -10.56
Canada 1.50 0.50 -66.67 9.29 8.52 -8.29
Finland 1.52 0.25 -83.55 5.98 14.46 141.81
Iceland 4.18 1.14 -72.73 2.85 2.24 -21.40
Norway 1.25 0.40 -68.00 3.98 4.03 1.26
New Zealand 2.70 0.54 -80.00 4.26 6.53 53.29
Spain 2.02 0.70 -65.35 14.94 17.11 14.52
Sweden 1.82 0.35 -80.77 2.81 7.36 161.92
UK 1.56 0.45 -71.15 9.21 6.46 -29.86
Average 2.03 0.55 -72.91 6.80 8.19 20.44
A further look at Table 3 shows that countres where the adopton of nflaton targetng has resulted n a 
greater declne n nflaton (a hgher dsnflaton under nflaton targetng) are the ones that have suffered 
from a hgher ncrease n unemployment (Fnland, Sweden, and New Zealand). Ths fndng supports the 
arguments that the short-run Phllps curve could be very flat near zero nflaton, and lowerng nflaton s 
ncreasngly costly when nflaton gets closer to zero.  See Stevens and Debelle (1995), Akerlof, Dckens and 
Perry (2000) and Lundborg and Sacklen (2006). 
A seres of unvarate autoregressve functons are used to test whether there are statstcally sgnfcant trend 
breaks at the tme of ntroducng nflaton targetng n the 9 countres n the sub-sample 1. Chow Breakpont 
tests (wth the null hypothess of no structural break n the quarter gven) are carred out to dentfy possble 
trend breaks. A summary of fndngs for nflaton processes are gven n Table . 
Table 4: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Inflation Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag 
Length
Constant Adj. R 
squared
IT 
introduced 
in
F-Statistic 
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio [Prob.]
Australia 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.4882 1993Q2 0.4650
[0.7073]
1.4686
[0.6895]
Canada 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.5958 1991Q1 6.4824
[0.0005]
18.8366
[0.0003]
Finland 1980Q3-
1998Q4
2 No 0.7761 1993Q2 2.3403
[0.1038]
4.7897
[0.0912]
Iceland 1980Q2-
2007Q1
1 No 0.8100 2001Q1 0.2398
[0.6254]
0.2440
[0.6213]
Norway 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.5916 2001Q1 3.3156
[0.0230]
10.0518
[0.0181]
New 
Zealand
1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.5918 1990Q1 3.6609
[0.0149]
11.0450
[0.0115]
Spain 1980Q4-
1998Q4
3 No 0.7832 1994Q4 0.7001
[0.5553]
2.2533
[0.5215]
Sweden 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.6323 1993Q1 0.6377
[0.5924]
2.0088
[0.5706]
UK 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.6521 1992Q4 0.2960
[0.7444]
0.6133
[0.7359]
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Results of the Chow Breakpont tests n Table  dsplay that the ntroducton of nflaton targetng marks a 
trend break n the nflaton processes only n Canada, Fnland, Norway, and New Zealand. Chow Breakpont 
test statstcs fal to reject the null hypothess of no structural break for the other countres. 
Table 5: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Unemployment Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag 
Length
Constant Adj. R 
squared
IT intro-
duced in
F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
Australia 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9744 1993Q2 2.2724
[0.0846]
6.9872
[0.0723]
Canada 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9665 1991Q1 3.0024
[0.0340]
9.1394
[0.0275]
Finland 1980Q2-
1998Q4
2 Yes 0.9940 1993Q2 2.1119
[0.1066]
6.5884
[0.0862]
Iceland 1988Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9689 2001Q1 0.4602
[0.7109]
1.4860
[0.6855]
Norway 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9596 2001Q1 0.8458
[0.4719]
2.6539
[0.4481]
New Zea-
land
1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9769 1990Q1 0.5195
[0.6698]
1.6377
[0.6509]
Spain 1980Q3-
1998Q4
3 Yes 0.9912 1994Q4 0.5412
[0.7060]
2.3884
[0.6647]
Sweden 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9922 1993Q1 1.0979
[0.3536]
3.4322
[0.3297]
UK 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9943 1992Q4 6.8174
[0.0003]
19.7369
[0.0002]
Smlarly, Table 5 shows the results of Chow Breakpont tests for unemployment processes. Introducton of 
nflaton targetng marks trend breaks n unemployment only n Australa, Canada, Fnland, and the UK. 
The absence of clear trend breaks at the tme of the ntroducton of nflaton targetng suggests that most 
countres have accepted “gradualsm” as opposed to the “cold turkey” approach when ntroducng nflaton 
targetng. 
c. Costs of Disinflation 
The above results confrm that the ntroducton of nflaton targetng has not occurred overnght but possbly 
follows a relatvely lengthy process. Therefore, the costs and benefts of Inflaton targetng, n partcular wth 
regard to unemployment (or output), must also be measured usng methods that cover a wder tme perod 
rather than measurng the nstantaneous effects.  
One way of analyzng the costs of dsnflaton s observng the changes to the nflaton-unemployment 
trade-off as measured by slope of the Phllps curve relatonshp. Inflaton-unemployment scatter plots for 
aggregated data as well as for ndvdual countres ndcate that the slope of the nflaton-output trade-off has 
ndeed lessened for the second sub-perod, confrmng a flattenng of the Phllps curve.  
It s noteworthy that the flattenng of the Phllps curve over 1990s has been a general tendency across 
countres, and a cross-secton analyss s requred to compare possble dfferences between Inflaton targetng 
and non-Inflaton targetng countres. Bean (2006) attrbutes the flattenng of the Phllps curve n the 
1990s to ncreased specalzaton, the ntensfcaton of product market competton, and the mpact of that 
ntensfed competton and mgraton on the behavour of wages. Roberts (2006), Mshkn (2007), and Razn 
and Bnyamn (2007) also produce smlar fndngs. Cecchett, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2006) attrbute 
ths mproved trade-off to prvate and publc nsttutonal changes as well as more effcent polcymakng by 
central banks. 
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For each country n ths sample, nflaton and unemployment are plotted aganst each other and t s observed 
that for all countres, the nflaton-output trade-off has lessened followng the ntroducton of Inflaton 
targetng. For Span and the UK, the trade-off seems to have dsappeared wth nflaton and unemployment 
havng a postve relatonshp. Table 6 summarzes the fndngs from these Inflaton-Unemployment scatter 
plots. A Before/After rato s computed for the slope, whch dsplays that flattenng of the Phllps curve 
relatonshp could be as much as 12 fold wth the ntroducton of Inflaton targetng. On average (dsregardng 
Span and the UK), ths mprovement s computed to be 5.76 fold.
Table 6:  Slope of Linear Regression Line of the Inflation-Unemployment 
Scatter Plot
Country Before IT After IT Before/After Ratio
Australia -0.3213 -0.0674 4.7671
Canada -0.1406 -0.0354 3.9718
Finland -0.1008 -0.0208 4.8461
Iceland -0.7722 -0.5278 1.4631
Norway -0.3856 -0.0393 9.8117
New Zealand -0.5970 -0.0539 11.0761
Spain -0.1858 0.1807 -
Sweden -0.3291 -0.0273 12.0550
UK -0.3064 0.0455 -
Average -0.3488 -0.0606 5.7558
The methodology that s adapted n the current study when measurng the possble costs of dsnflaton 
assocated wth the ntroducton of Inflaton targetng prmarly follows Anderson (1992), Ball (1993, 199), 
and Anderson and Wascher (1999) who calculate sacrfce ratos from actual developments n nflaton, output, 
and unemployment durng ndvdual epsodes of dsnflaton. Ball (1993, 199) uses the peak nflaton as the 
startng pont for dsnflaton. However, snce our nterest s n the costs and benefts of Inflaton targetng, 
changes n unemployment (cost) and changes n nflaton (beneft) durng the perod around the adopton of 
Inflaton targetng wll be taken nto consderaton. Therefore, the current method s closer to the one used 
n Anderson and Wascher (1999) where they consder changes over a longer tme perod to compute the 
sacrfce rato. Also, observng the changes over a longer perod addresses the concerns expressed by Mayes 
and Chapple (199) who argue that “sacrfce ratos have been tradtonally vewed as short-run concepts, just 
lookng at the cost of the perod of dsnflaton. However, the polces are ntended to be of net beneft. The 
approprate calculaton would therefore also take nto account the subsequent gans” (p.19).
As sad before, the process of dsnflaton n countres that adopt Inflaton targetng could commence several 
quarters before the actual adopton of Inflaton targetng framework. For consstency, t s assumed that ths 
process could commence 12 quarters (3 years) pror to the country adopted Inflaton targetng. The cumulatve 
changes n nflaton and unemployment durng the perod from 12 quarters before Inflaton targetng to 12 
quarters after Inflaton targetng are provded n Table 7.
Table 7 shows that nflaton has ndeed declned durng the 3-year perod before Inflaton targetng. In New 
Zealand, ths dsnflaton has been as much as by 7.3 percentage ponts, whle for Australa, Fnland, Span, 
Sweden, and the UK, the declne n nflaton has been by 0.5 to 1 percentage pont. There has been no 
dsnflaton durng ths perod n Canada, Iceland and Norway. All countres n the sub-sample that have 
experenced dsnflaton durng the three years before the adopton of Inflaton targetng have also faced 
ncreasng unemployment as well. 
Dsnflaton that occurred followng Inflaton targetng s also shown n Table 7. All countres expect for the 
UK, have enjoyed reduced nflaton durng the 3 years mmedately after Inflaton targetng. Australa and 
Span have experenced declnes n unemployment durng ths perod. 
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The last two columns of Table 7 present the total changes n nflaton and unemployment durng the 6-year 
perod surroundng the adopton of Inflaton targetng. Except for Iceland, dsnflaton processes have taken 
place n all other countres and have been assocated wth ncreased rates of unemployment.
Table 7: Cumulative Changes in Inflation and Unemployment during the 
Adoption of Inflation Targeting
Country IT Introduced in During the 3 years Before IT During the 3 years After IT Total
DLCPI U DLCPI U DLCPI U
Australia 1993Q2 -0.0084 0.0470 -0.0052 -0.0260 -0.0136 0.0210
Canada 1991Q1 0.0079 0.0103 -0.0104 0.0211 -0.0025 0.0314
Finland 1993Q2 -0.0079 0.1190 -0.0034 0.0020 -0.0113 0.1210
Iceland 2001Q1 0.0063 -0.0230 -0.0020 0.0212 0.0044 -0.0018
Norway 2001Q1 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0054 0.0110 -0.0053 0.0100
New 
Zealand
1990Q1 -0.0731 0.0298 -0.0079 0.0324 -0.0810 0.0622
Spain 1994Q4 -0.0053 0.0630 -0.0043 -0.0290 -0.0096 0.0340
Sweden 1993Q1 -0.0098 0.0490 -0.0046 0.0250 -0.0144 0.0740
UK 1992Q4 -0.0081 0.0290 0.0026 -0.0150 -0.0054 0.0140
Notes: 1. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are italicized. 
2. Finland and Spain abandoned Inflation targeting in 1999Q1 in favour of the EU.
Table 8 presents the Sacrfce Ratos for each country for the possble perods of dsnflaton. Sacrfce 
Ratos are not computed for counter-ntutve epsodes. The fndngs suggest that dsnflaton assocated wth 
Inflaton targetng could occur before ts mplementaton, after ts mplementaton or durng both perods. 
Durng the entre 6-year perod surroundng the ntroducton of Inflaton targetng countres have experenced 
Sacrfce Ratos varyng between 0.8 and 12.5.  
Table 8: Sacrifice Ratios during the Adoption of Inflation Targeting
Country IT Introduced in SR during the 3 
years Before IT
SR during the 3 
years After IT
Total Sacrifice Ratio
Australia 1993Q2 5.56 -5.02 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 1.54 
Canada 1991Q1 -1.30 (DLCPI↑, U↑) 2.03 12.51 
Finland 1993Q2 15.02 0.59 10.69
Iceland 2001Q1 3.63 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 10.67 0.41 (DLCPI↑, U↓)
Norway 2001Q1 5.56 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 2.02 1.90 
New Zealand 1990Q1 0.41 4.10 0.77 
Spain 1994Q4 11.80 -6.77 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 3.53 
Sweden 1993Q1 5.00 5.45 5.14 
UK 1992Q4 3.60 5.74 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 2.57 
Notes: 1. Sacrifice ratio is computed as cumulative change in the unemployment rate divided by the cumulative change in  
  inflation (change in CPI) (Signs reversed).
 2. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
  italicized.  
 3. Finland and Spain abandoned Inflation targeting in 1999Q1 in favour of the EU.
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5.1.2. Summary of Findings: Sub-sample 1 
In sub-sample 1 (Inflaton Targetng Industral Countres), t was observed that there s a negatve correlaton 
between nflaton and unemployment suggestng a trade-off, and the trade-off lessens sgnfcantly after 
two years of nflaton targetng. Also average nflaton has declned consderably after nflaton targetng, 
but experences wth regard to unemployment vary. Countres n whch there have been a greater declne 
n nflaton, have experenced hgher ncreases n unemployment rates. Chow breakpont tests confrm 
that the ntroducton of nflaton targetng has not happened suddenly but has been preceded by a gradual 
dsnflatonary process. The employment sacrfce as measured by the slope of the Phllps curve relatonshp 
shows that the slope has lessened followng nflaton targetng for all countres n the sample. Also, the 
sacrfce rato (cumulatve change n unemployment rate dvded by the cumulatve change n nflaton durng 
the adopton of nflaton targetng) – ncreased unemployment as a result of lower nflaton, and the rato 
vares between 0.8 and 12.5 among countres. 
 5.2. Sub-Sample 2: Inflation Targeters – Emerging Market Countries
5.2.1. Measuring the Trade-off
a. Correlation between Inflation and Unemployment
The second sub-sample ncludes the emergng market nflaton targeters (Brazl, Czech Republc, Hungary, 
Republc of Korea, Mexco, Poland, Slovak Republc, and Turkey). The coeffcents of correlaton between 
nflaton and unemployment before and after adoptng Inflaton targetng n countres n sub-sample 2 
are gven n Table 9. All countres n the sub-sample apart from Hungary and Mexco, dsplay a trade-off 
between nflaton and unemployment as shown by negatve coeffcents of correlaton between 0.2 and 0.65. 
However, n Brazl, Republc of Korea, Slovak Republc, and Turkey, the coeffcent of correlaton become 
postve followng the adopton of Inflaton targetng, suggestng that there s no trade-off between nflaton 
and unemployment, whle for Poland, the negatve coeffcent weakens. 
Table 9: Coefficients of Correlation : Inflation and Unemployment
Country Before IT After IT
Brazl -0.230 0.3060
Czech Republc -0.3789 -0.5058
Hungary 0.6697 -0.056
Republc of Korea -0.108 0.2519
Mexco 0.3016 -0.1609
Poland -0.677 -0.6063
Slovak Republc -0.3712 0.276
Turkey -0.629 0.2223
Average -0.2132 -0.036
Aggregated nflaton and unemployment for the countres n ths sub-sample 2 quarters before and after 
adoptng Inflaton targetng are shown n Fgure 2. Smlar to Fgure 1 wth sub-sample 1, T s the quarter 
n whch the country adopted Inflaton targetng. The two trend seres, of nflaton (HPDLCPI) and of 
Unemployment (HPU) are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter λ=1,600.  
Unlke n sub-sample 1, the trade-off between nflaton and unemployment s not clear n sub-sample 2. 
There has been a contnuous declne n nflaton n the 2-quarter perod precedng the adopton of Inflaton 
targetng, whle nflaton has been remarkably stable n the perod followng the ntroducton of Inflaton 
targetng. Ths ndcates that Inflaton targetng has been successful n contanng the hyper-nflatons 
experenced by some countres n ths sub-sample, and that these countres have adopted Inflaton targetng 
only after sgnfcant dsnflatonary processes. However, the low level of nflaton n these countres appears 
to have occurred wth rsng unemployment levels. Wthn the frst 2 quarters followng Inflaton targetng, 
unemployment has rsen contnuously for ths sub-sample. 
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b. Structural Breaks in Inflation and Unemployment following Inflation Targeting
As shown n Table 10 average nflaton has declned n all countres n the sub-sample followng Inflaton 
targetng. The mean nflaton has fallen by around 7 percentage ponts (a declne of 85 per cent). On the 
other hand, smlar to sub-sample 1 there s no common pattern wth regard to unemployment. Levels of 
unemployment have ncreased n Brazl, Czech Republc, Republc of Korea, Poland and Turkey, whle the 
other countres have experenced fallng unemployment. On average, the ncrease n unemployment s 12.7 
per cent compared wth the declne n nflaton of 85 per cent 
Table 10: Inflation and Unemployment Rate
Country Inflation (Per cent) Unemployment (Per cent)
Before IT After IT % Change Before IT After IT % Change
Brazil 26.32 1.79 -93.20 9.59 11.45 19.40
Czech Republic 2.86 0.72 -74.83 2.85 8.65 203.51
Hungary 3.49 1.32 -62.18 9.22 6.42 -30.37
Rep. of Korea 1.55 0.73 -52.90 3.33 3.60 8.11
Mexico 8.24 1.09 -86.77 3.53 3.40 -3.68
Poland 10.29 0.92 -91.06 12.06 16.23 34.58
Slovak Republic 2.33 0.78 -66.52 13.67 10.75 -21.36
Turkey 10.58 2.37 -77.60 8.17 9.86 20.69
Average 8.21 1.22 -85.20 7.80 8.80 12.72
Quarterly Inflation and Unemployment - Before and After IT
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Notes: 
1. DLCPI (Left axis)  is the average inflation for the 8 countries in the sub-sample.
2. U (Right axis) is the average unemployment for the same 8 countries.
3. Due to different dates of adopting Inflation targeting, data are available for Turkey only up to 
T+4, for Slovak Republic only up to T+8, and for Hungary only up to T+23.
Figure 2: Aggregated Data – Sub-sample 2
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Smlar to sub-sample 1, a seres of unvarate autoregressve functons are used to test whether there are 
statstcally sgnfcant trend breaks at the tme of ntroducng Inflaton targetng n the 8 countres n the 
sub-sample 2. Chow Breakpont tests (wth the null hypothess of no structural break at the quarter n whch 
Inflaton targetng was ntroduced) are carred out to dentfy possble trend breaks. A summary of fndngs 
for nflaton processes are gven n Table 11. 
Results of the Chow Breakpont tests n Table 11 dsplay that the ntroducton of Inflaton targetng marks 
a trend break n the nflaton processes only n Czech Republc. Chow Breakpont test statstcs fal to reject 
the null hypothess of no structural break for all the other countres.
Table 11: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Inflation Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag 
Length
Constant Adj. R 
squared
Test for F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio [Prob.]
Brazil 1992Q4-
2007Q1
1 No 0.7150 1999Q2 0.0004
[0.9835]
0.0004
[0.9831]
Czech Republic 1991Q3-
2007Q1
1 Yes 0.2909 1998Q1 8.2149
[0.0007]
15.4770
[0.0004]
Hungary 1981Q1-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.6326 2001Q2 0.9295
[0.4502]
3.9493
[0.4129]
Republic of Korea 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.5349 2001Q1 0.3006
[0.8769]
1.2924
[0.8627]
Mexico 1980Q2-
2007Q1
1 No 0.8243 2001Q1 0.0346
[0.8567]
0.0353
[0.8509]
Poland 1980Q4-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.6900 1998Q4 0.9306
[0.4289]
2.9188
[0.4043]
Slovak Republic 1991Q3-
2007Q1
1 Yes 0.1130 2005Q1 1.5629
[0.2181]
3.2523
[0.1967]
Turkey 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.5767 2006Q1 0.0278
[0.9937]
0.0884
[0.9932]
Table 12: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Unemployment Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag 
Length
Constant Adj. R 
squared
Test for F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
Brazil 1981Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9051 1999Q2 0.3678
[0.7764]
1.1650
[0.7614]
Czech Republic 1990Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9935 1998Q1 3.6561
[0.0172]
11.0787
[0.0113]
Hungary 1992Q1-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9760 2001Q2 0.7449
[0.4795]
1.5770
[0.4545]
Republic of 
Korea
1989Q4-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.9507 2001Q1 2.3510
[0.0638]
9.8856
[0.0424]
Mexico 1987Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9071 2001Q1 1.0142
[0.3914]
3.2259
[0.3581]
Poland 1990Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9852 1998Q4 1.1093
[0.3523]
3.5590
[0.3132]
Slovak Republic 1990Q3-
2007Q1
1 Yes 0.8940 2005Q1 2.8481
[0.0654]
5.7996
[0.0550]
Turkey 1989Q1-
2006Q4
1 No 0.9030 2006Q1 0.8427
[0.3618]
0.8612
[0.3533]
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Table 12, whch shows the results of Chow Breakpont tests for unemployment processes, suggests that the 
ntroducton of Inflaton targetng marks trend breaks n unemployment only n Czech Republc, Republc of 
Korea and Slovak Republc. 
As mentoned earler, ths fndng further strengthens that emergng market countres whch adopted Inflaton 
targetng also preferred a “gradualst” approach vs-à-vs the “cold turkey” approach, and supports the fact 
that they have only done so several quarters followng successful dsnflatonary processes. 
c. Costs of Disinflation 
The Phllps curve relatonshp for ndvdual countres n the sub-sample s also computed. For Czech 
Republc and Poland, the nflaton-output trade-off has lessened followng the ntroducton of Inflaton 
targetng. For Brazl, Republc of Korea, and Slovak Republc, the trade-off seems to have dsappeared wth 
nflaton and unemployment havng a postve relatonshp. Table 13 summarzes the fndngs from these 
Inflaton-Unemployment scatter plots. The Before/After rato for the slope dsplays that flattenng of the 
Phllps curve relatonshp s around 3.8 tmes for Czech Republc and 10.6 fold for Poland. 
Table 13: Slope of Linear Regression Line of the Inflation-Unemployment 
Scatter Plot
Country Before IT After IT Before/After Ratio
Brazil -5.0760 0.1847 -
Czech Republic -1.2966 -0.3414 3.7979
Hungary 0.5760 -0.0417 -
Republic of Korea -0.2033 0.3391 -
Mexico 1.7100 -0.1195 -
Poland -2.1186 -0.2001 10.5877
Slovak Republic -0.2582 0.1302 -
Turkey -2.3501 … -
Average -1.1271 -0.0070 162.0062
Notes: 1. Scenarios where there is no trade-off are italicized.
 2. Turkey’s after IT sub-period includes only 4 observations.
As wth the sub-sample 1, the sacrfce rato s calculated usng the changes n unemployment (cost) and 
changes n nflaton (beneft) durng the perod around the adopton of Inflaton targetng. 
Cumulatve changes n nflaton and unemployment durng the perod from 12 quarters before Inflaton 
targetng to 12 quarters after Inflaton targetng are provded n Table 1. Accordngly, nflaton has declned 
durng the 3-year perod before Inflaton targetng n all countres n the sample wthn a range of 0.2 per 
cent to .5 per cent. Dsnflaton durng ths perod has accompanes hgher unemployment n Brazl, Czech 
Republc and Republc of Korea. Followng Inflaton targetng, all countres except for Hungary, Republc of 
Korea, and Turkey, show further declne n nflaton. 
The last two columns of Table 1 present the total changes n nflaton and unemployment durng the 6-
year perod surroundng the adopton of Inflaton targetng. All countres record dsnflaton durng ths 
perod, and except for Hungary, Slovak Republc and Turkey, t has been assocated wth ncreased rates of 
unemployment.
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Table 14: Cumulative Changes in Inflation and Unemployment during the 
Adoption of Inflation Targeting
Country IT Introduced in During the 3 years Before IT During the 3 years After IT Total
DLCPI U DLCPI U DLCPI U
Brazil 1999Q2 -0.0224 0.0350 -0.0024 -0.0140 -0.0248 0.0210
Czech Republic 1998Q1 -0.0076 0.0188 -0.0064 0.0365 -0.0140 0.0553
Hungary 2001Q2 -0.0174 -0.0330 0.0088 -0.0010 -0.0086 -0.0340
Rep. of Korea 2001Q1 -0.0073 0.0140 0.0060 -0.0050 -0.0013 0.0090
Mexico 2001Q1 -0.0162 -0.0100 -0.0090 0.0130 -0.0252 0.0030
Poland 1998Q4 -0.0227 -0.0534 -0.0060 0.0670 -0.0287 0.0136
Slovak Republic 2005Q1 -0.0028 -0.0523 -0.0067 -0.0439 -0.0096 -0.0962
Turkey 2006Q1 -0.0446 -0.0031 0.0022 -0.0080 -0.0424 -0.0111
Notes: 1. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are italicized. 
2. Slovak Republic’s and Turkey’s after IT sample has only 9 and 4 observation sets, respectively.
Table 15 presents the Sacrfce Ratos for each country for the possble perods of dsnflaton. Sacrfce 
Ratos are not computed for counter-ntutve epsodes. The fndngs suggest that dsnflaton assocated wth 
Inflaton targetng could occur before ts mplementaton, after ts mplementaton or durng both perods. 
Durng the entre 6-year perod surroundng the ntroducton of Inflaton targetng countres have experenced 
Sacrfce Ratos varyng between 0.1 and 6.8 
Table 15: Sacrifice Ratios during the Adoption of Inflation Targeting
Country IT Introduced in SR during the 3 
years Before IT
SR during the 3 
years After IT
Total Sacrifice Ratio
Brazil 1999Q2 1.56 -5. 84 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 0.85 
Czech Republic 1998Q1 2.46 5.69 3.94 
Hungary 2001Q2 -1.90 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 0.11 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -3.94 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Rep. of Korea 2001Q1 1.92 0.84 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 6.81
Mexico 2001Q1 -0.62 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 1.44 0.12 
Poland 1998Q4 -2.35 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 11.26 0.47 
Slovak Republic 2005Q1 -18.47(DLCPI↓, U↓) -6.52 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -10.06 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Turkey 2006Q1 -0.07 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 3.60 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -0.26 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Notes: 1. Sacrifice ratio is computed as cumulative change in the unemployment rate divided by the cumulative change in 
inflation (change in CPI) (Signs reversed).
 2. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are 
italicized.  
 3. Slovak Republic’s and Turkey’s after IT sample has only 9 and 4 observation sets, respectively.
5.2.2. Summary of Findings: Sub-sample 2 
Wth regard to the nflaton targetng emergng market countres, generally, there has been a negatve 
correlaton between nflaton and unemployment. Ths has almost dsappeared on average after Inflaton 
targetng. Average nflaton has declned sgnfcantly after Inflaton targetng, but average unemployment 
has ncreased. Chow breakpont tests confrm that dsnflaton has contnued over a reasonable perod around 
adoptng Inflaton targetng and not overnght. The employment sacrfce as measured by the slope of the 
Phllps curve relatonshp has flattened sgnfcantly for all countres, whle the sacrfce rato shows that 
around the tme of adoptng Inflaton targetng, both nflaton and unemployment has decreased hnderng the 
computaton of sacrfce ratos n most countres. For those countres where sacrfce rato can be computed, 
t has been between 0.1 and 6.8.
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5.3. Sub-Sample 3: Euro Zone 
Sub-sample 3 s a comparator/control sample and ncludes the countres, whch has adopted the Euro as ther 
sole currency.  The countres n ths sample are Austra, Belgum, Fnland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Span. Of the Euro Zone, the only country that does not 
appear n the present study s Slovena, and the reason for ts absence s the lack of avalablty of data. 
In order to compare ths sub-sample wth the frst two sub-samples, the creaton of Euro n Quarter 1, 1999 s 
consdered as the alternatve adopted by the countres n ths sample to Inflaton targetng. It wll be explored 
whether the experences of the Euro Zone countres are smlar to those experenced by nflaton targeters 
wth regard to nflaton and unemployment. However, t should be noted that the nature of the prevous 
monetary polcy regmes of the countres n sub-sample 3 are gnored (for example, Fnland and Span had 
Inflaton targetng regmes, whle Germany had a Monetary Targetng regme). 
The pre Euro experence of ths sub-sample s also dvded nto two, n order to analyze whether any change 
n nflaton and unemployment n these countres actually occurred before the creaton of the Euro Zone. The 
break pont chosen s Quarter 1, 1993, whch s the medan quarter that the early nflaton targeters (Australa, 
Canada, Fnland, New Zealand, Span, Sweden, UK) adopted Inflaton targetng as ther monetary polcy 
framework. 
5.3.1. Measuring the Trade-off
a. Correlation between Inflation and Unemployment
Table 16 shows the coeffcents of correlaton between nflaton and unemployment before and after adoptng 
Inflaton targetng n countres n sub-sample 1. Apart from Belgum, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal 
show a negatve correlaton between nflaton and unemployment before adoptng the Euro. Belgum, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal also dsplay a worsenng of the nflaton-unemployment trade-off 
as suggested by negatve/ncreased coeffcents of correlaton. However, on average, the countres n the sub-
sample dsplay lessenng of the trade-off between nflaton and unemployment as shown by the weakenng of 
the negatve coeffcent of correlaton from 0.375 to 0.126.
Table 16: Coefficients of Correlation : Inflation and Unemployment
Country Before EURO (1979-1998) After EURO (1999-2007)
Austria -0.5186 -0.0852
Belgium 0.0012 -0.1320
Finland -0.6887 0.0808
France -0.8495 -0.1618
Germany -0.4705 0.0017
Greece -0.8006 -0.0060
Ireland 0.0682 -0.4674
Italy -0.9115 0.2517
Luxembourg 0.2054 -0.0230
The Netherlands -0.3158 -0.6699
Portugal 0.3562 -0.2914
Spain -0.5758 -0.0092
Average -0.3750 -0.1260
Table 17, whch looks at the two sub-perods wthn the Before Euro perod suggests that much of the 
weakenng of the negatve correlaton between nflaton and unemployment has occurred between the perod 
1993-1998, than n the post Euro perod.
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Table 17: Coefficients of Correlation : Inflation and Unemployment
Country Before EURO After EURO
(1999-2007)(1979-1992) (1993-1998)
Austria -0.4150 -0.2924 -0.0852
Belgium 0.1312 -0.1737 -0.1320
Finland -0.3052 -0.1218 0.0808
France -0.8487 -0.0764 -0.1618
Germany -0.4710 -0.5444 0.0017
Greece -0.2207 -0.7499 -0.0060
Ireland -0.5295 -0.0532 -0.4674
Italy -0.9233 -0.4079 0.2517
Luxembourg 0.4186 -0.1984 -0.0230
The Netherlands -0.4598 0.1396 -0.6699
Portugal 0.4801 -0.2545 -0.2914
Spain -0.4937 0.7134 -0.0092
Average -0.3031 -0.1683 -0.1260
Aggregated nflaton and unemployment for the countres n ths sub-sample 2 quarters before and after the 
ntroducton of the Euro are shown n Fgure 3. Both trend nflaton and trend unemployment seem to have 
declned before Euro whle both trend seres seem to have stablzed after the ntroducton of the Euro.  There 
s hardly any evdence of a trade-off. 
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Figure 3: Aggregated Data – Sub-sample 3
Notes: 
1. DLCPI (Left axis)  is the average inflation for the 12 countries in the sub-sample.
2. U (Right axis) is the average unemployment for the same 12 countries.
92
“Central Banking and Financial Markets” Central Bank of Sri Lanka Inaugural International Research Conference
Figure 4: Aggregated Data (Extended) – Sub-sample 3
Quarterly Inflation and Unemployment - Before and After EURO 
(Extended Sample)
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Fgure  also consders the perod around 1993Q1. A trade-off between nflaton and unemployment exsts n 
the 1979-1992 perod and the early part of 1993-1998 perod before t dsappears n the post Euro perod. 
b. Structural Breaks in Inflation and Unemployment following Inflation Targeting 
Table 18 nvestgates whether average nflaton and unemployment have changed before and after Euro. All 
countres n the sub-sample show a declne n mean nflaton of around 59.2 per cent (but only by around 75 
bass ponts n absolute terms) on average for perod followng the creaton of Euro. The “after Euro” perod 
also shows an ncrease n mean unemployment n all countres by around 13.8 per cent (or 1.1 percentage 
ponts).
Table 18: Inflation and Unemployment Rate
Country Inflation (Per cent) Unemployment (Per cent)
Before EURO After EURO % Change Before EURO After EURO % Change
Austria 0.77 0.45 -41.56 3.55 4.24 19.44
Belgium 0.87 0.51 -41.38 8.91 7.82 -12.23
Finland 1.14 0.38 -66.67 8.55 8.97 4.91
France 1.11 0.42 -62.16 9.53 9.35 -1.89
Germany 0.68 0.38 -44.12 6.62 8.35 26.13
Greece 3.59 0.78 -78.27 7.92 10.33 30.43
Ireland 1.37 0.93 -32.12 14.02 4.52 -67.76
Italy 1.81 0.56 -69.06 8.92 8.64 -3.14
Luxembourg 0.85 0.59 -30.59 2.55 3.48 36.47
The 
Netherlands
0.64 0.55 -14.06 6.52 3.48 -46.63
Portugal 2.75 0.73 -73.45 6.59 5.79 -12.14
Spain 1.72 0.78 -54.65 15.43 10.49 -32.02
Average 1.44 0.59 -59.19 8.26 7.12 -13.77
Mean
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However, as evdenced earler, much of the declne n nflaton has occurred durng the 1993-1998 sub-
perod. As shown n Table 19, nflaton has declned by an average of 62.6 per cent from 1979-1992 to 1993-
1998 perod. In comparson to 1993-1998 perod, the declne n nflaton followng the ntroducton of the 
Euro s only 12.3 per cent (or n absolute terms only by 8 bass ponts). Any dsnflaton n the countres n 
the Euro Zone had occurred well before the creaton of Euro. 
Another key feature n Table 19 s the changes n unemployment durng the pre Euro perod. In most countres 
(except for Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal), unemployment has ncreased wthn the 1979-1992 and 
1993-1998 perods correspondng to the sgnfcant declne n nflaton between these perods. Remarkably, 
n all countres except for Austra, Greece and Luxembourg, unemployment has declned followng the 
ntroducton of the Euro compared wth the 1993-1998 perod. Average unemployment followng the Euro s 
even slghtly lower than average unemployment between the 1979-1992 sub-perod
Table 19: Inflation and Unemployment Rate
Country Inflation (Per cent)
Before EURO BeforeEURO % Change Before EURO After EURO % Change
1979-1992 1993-1998 1993-1998 1999-2007
Austria 0.91 0.49 -46.51 0.49 0.45 -6.54
Belgium 1.07 0.43 -59.45 0.43 0.51 16.93
Finland 1.54 0.28 -82.09 0.28 0.38 38.02
France 1.45 0.36 -74.97 0.36 0.42 15.51
Germany 0.75 0.50 -32.67 0.50 0.38 -24.61
Greece 4.36 1.91 -56.13 1.91 0.78 -59.11
Ireland 1.77 0.49 -72.40 0.49 0.93 90.04
Italy 2.26 0.85 -62.46 0.85 0.56 -33.49
Luxembourg 1.05 0.42 -60.42 0.42 0.59 41.71
The Netherlands 0.68 0.55 -18.57 0.55 0.55 -1.21
Portugal 3.58 0.94 -73.73 0.94 0.73 -22.64
Spain 2.13 0.83 -61.07 0.83 0.78 -5.72
Average 1.80 0.67 -62.63 0.67 0.59 -12.30
Unemployment (Per cent)
Before EURO Before EURO % Change Before EURO After EURO % Change
1979-1992 1993-1998 1993-1998 1999-2007
Austria 3.33 4.03 21.12 4.03 4.24 5.11
Belgium 8.71 9.36 7.49 9.36 7.82 -16.43
Finland 5.81 14.48 149.14 14.48 8.97 -38.05
France 8.68 11.35 30.81 11.35 9.35 -17.66
Germany 5.79 8.42 45.44 8.42 8.35 -0.82
Greece 6.90 9.44 36.81 9.44 10.33 9.44
Ireland 15.19 11.88 -21.77 11.88 4.52 -61.95
Italy 8.01 10.89 35.98 10.89 8.64 -20.65
Luxembourg 2.40 2.81 17.19 2.81 3.48 23.91
The Netherlands 6.89 5.73 -16.91 5.73 3.48 -39.18
Portugal 6.65 6.49 -2.38 6.49 5.79 -10.79
Spain 14.41 17.62 22.28 17.62 10.49 -40.48
Average 7.73 9.38 21.28 9.38 7.12 -24.03
Mean
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The unvarate autoregressve functons for nflaton and unemployment are carred out to test whether 
there are statstcally sgnfcant trend breaks at the tme of ntroducng the Euro n the 12 countres n the 
sub-sample 3. Chow Breakpont tests (wth the null hypothess of no structural break at the quarter of the 
ntroducton of the Euro) are performed to dentfy possble trend breaks. A summary of fndngs for nflaton 
processes are gven n Table 20, and Chow Breakpont test statstcs fal to reject the null hypothess of no 
structural break for all countres n ths sample. 
Table 20: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Inflation Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag Length Constant Adj. R 
squared
Test for F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likeli-
hood Ratio
[Prob.]
Austria 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.4233 1999Q1 0.2575
[0.9044]
1.1084
[0.8929]
Belgium 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.6556 1999Q1 1.5576
[0.2044]
4.8410
[0.1838]
Finland 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.7788 1999Q1 0.9726
[0.4088]
3.0473
[0.3844]
France 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.8541 1999Q1 1.6210
[0.2027]
3.3161
[0.1905]
Germany 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.3924 1999Q1 1.6791
[0.1763]
5.2077
[0.1572]
Greece 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.8170 1999Q1 0.8400
[0.4346]
1.7311
[0.4208]
Ireland 1981Q1-
2007Q1
4 No 0.7762 1999Q1 1.2526
[0.2940]
5.2883
[0.2590]
Italy 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.9254 1999Q1 0.3168
[0.8132]
1.0026
[0.8006]
Luxembourg 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.5814 1999Q1 1.0495
[0.3742]
3.2858
[0.3496]
The 
Netherlands
1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.5368 1999Q1 0.1159
[0.9766]
0.5004
[0.9735]
Portugal 1981Q1-
2007Q1
4 No 0.8248 1999Q1 0.1088
[0.9792]
0.4702
[0.9763]
Spain 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.7795 1999Q1 0.5528
[0.6474]
1.7436
[0.6273]
However, wth regard to unemployment, t s noteworthy that 6 out of the 12 countres (Belgum, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, and Span) n the sample mark structural breaks at the tme of ntroducng the Euro, 
as shown n Table 21.
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Table 21: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Unemployment Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag Length Constant Adj. R 
squared
Test for F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
Austria 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.8357 1999Q1 0.7040
[0.5518]
2.2133
[0.5293]
Belgium 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9547 1999Q1 3.7971
[0.0126]
11.4342
[0.0096]
Finland 1980Q3-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.9938 1999Q1 0.3650
[0.8330]
1.5663
[0.8148]
France 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9882 1999Q1 2.3028
[0.0815]
7.0776
[0.0695]
Germany 1980Q4-
2007Q1
4 Yes 0.9623 1999Q1 4.6438
[0.0008]
22.9613
[0.0003]
Greece 1984Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9804 1999Q1 4.9414
[0.0093]
9.7911
[0.0075]
Ireland 1982Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9968 1999Q1 0.1508
[0.8602]
0.3138
[0.8548]
Italy 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9862 1999Q1 9.3996
[0.0000]
26.3616
[0.0000]
Luxembourg 1982Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9511 1999Q1 0.9911
[0.3750]
2.0444
[0.3598]
The 
Netherlands
1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9865 1999Q1 0.0376
[0.9632]
0.0780
[0.9618]
Portugal 1983Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9832 1999Q1 1.1082
[0.3501]
3.4841
[0.3228]
Spain 1980Q3-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.9937 1999Q1 3.3867
[0.0122]
13.7227
[0.0082]
Table 22 examnes whether structural breaks can be dentfed for 1993Q1, the medan date of adoptng 
Inflaton targetng by the poneerng countres. However, structural breaks for nflaton processes are 
dentfed only for Belgum, Fnland and Germany and for unemployment processes only for Germany, 
Ireland and Italy.
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Table 22: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Inflation and Unemployment Processes
Country Test for For Inflation Process For Unemployment Process
F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
Austria 1993Q1 0.7793
[0.5413]
3.3192
[0.5059]
0.7229
[0.5406]
2.2721
[0.5179]
Belgium 1993Q1 2.8597
[0.0407]
8.7247
[0.0332]
0.3331
[0.8014]
1.0530
[0.7884]
Finland 1993Q1 3.6252
[0.0156]
10.9427
[0.0120]
1.3946
[0.2414]
5.8653
[0.2094]
France 1993Q1 2.0056
[0.1398]
4.0878
[0.1295]
1.4831
[0.2236]
4.6111
[0.2026]
Germany 1993Q1 3.0505
[0.0320]
9.2807
[0.0258]
5.2917
[0.0002]
25.8030
[0.0001]
Greece 1993Q1 1.0108
[0.3675]
2.0797
[0.3535]
1.4152
[0.2484]
2.9133
[0.2330]
Ireland 1993Q1 1.7436
[0.1466]
7.2905
[0.1213]
6.0839
[0.0033]
11.9313
[0.0026]
Italy 1993Q1 0.8672
[0.4608]
2.7226
[0.4364]
3.4502
[0.0194]
10.4385
[0.0152]
Luxembourg 1993Q1 1.1402
[0.3366]
3.5652
[0.3124]
0.8624
[0.4254]
1.7813
[0.4104]
The Netherlands 1993Q1 2525
[0.9075]
1.0869
[0.8963]
0.6917
[0.5030]
1.4272
[0.4899]
Portugal 1993Q1 0.4093
[0.8016]
1.7573
[0.7803]
0.4813
[0.6961]
1.5289
[0.6756
Spain 1993Q1 0.0971
[0.9615]
0.3082
[0.9548]
1.6308
[0.1725]
6.8278
[0.1453]
The noton of “gradualsm” s agan confrmed n ths sub-sample. However, the mportant feature n ths sub-
sample wth regard to structural break s that trends n unemployment has changed followng the ntroducton 
of the Euro for several large economes n the Euro Zone as shown n Table 21. 
c. Costs of Disinflation 
The changes to the nflaton-unemployment trade-off as measured by slope of the Phllps curve relatonshp 
are observed wth a vew to analyze the costs of dsnflaton. Table 23 summarzes the fndngs from the 
Inflaton-Unemployment scatter plots for ndvdual countres, and calculates the Before/After rato for the 
slope. On average the slope of the trade-off has declned from 0.19 to 0.07, a declne by around 2.8 per 
cent.
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Table 23: Slope of Linear Regression Line of the Inflation-Unemployment 
Scatter Plot
Country Before IT After IT Before/After Ratio
Austria -0.4152 -0.0330 12.5818
Belgium 0.0006 -0.0513 - 
Finland -0.1325 0.0323 - 
France -0.5164 -0.0623 8.2889
Germany -0.1508 0.0005 - 
Greece -0.8150 -0.0020 407.5000
Ireland 0.0218 -0.4084 - 
Italy -0.5996 0.0269 - 
Luxembourg 0.2707 -0.0056 - 
The Netherlands -0.1137 -0.2483 0.4579
Portugal 0.4037 -0.0582 - 
Spain -0.2098 -0.0024 87.4167
Average -0.1880 -0.0677 2.7793
Note: 1. Scenarios where there is no trade-off are italicized.
In order to compute sacrfce ratos from actual developments n nflaton and unemployment durng possble 
epsodes of dsnflaton assocated wth the ntroducton of the Euro, changes n unemployment and changes 
n nflaton are consdered. Usng these changes, cumulatve changes n nflaton and unemployment durng 
the perod from 12 quarters before the ntroducton of the Euro to 12 quarters after the ntroducton of the Euro 
are provded n Table 2. The Table shows that although nflaton has generally declned durng the 3-year 
perod before Euro, t has ncreased followng the ntroducton of the Euro. Unemployment has declned n 
both sub-perods. Accordng, when the 6-year perod surroundng the ntroducton of the Euro s consdered 
t total, nflaton shows mxed results whle unemployment has generally declned. A trade-off relatonshp 
s hard to fnd n ths sub-sample, and s only lmted to Germany, Greece, and Italy for the frst sub-perod, 
and only to Greece n the total perod.
Table 24: Cumulative Changes in Inflation and Unemployment during the 
Introduction of the Euro
Country Euro 
Introduced 
in
During the 3 years Before 
EURO
During the 3 years After 
EURO
Total
DLCPI U DLCPI U DLCPI U
Austria  1999Q1 0.0013 0.0030 0.0003 -0.0020 0.0016 0.0010
Belgium  1999Q1 -0.0019 -0.0060 0.0025 -0.0180 0.0006 -0.0240
Finland  1999Q1 0.0042 -0.0460 -0.0014 -0.0180 0.0029 -0.0640
France  1999Q1 -0.0059 -0.0010 0.0016 -0.0260 -0.0043 -0.0270
Germany  1999Q1 -0.0032 0.0030 0.0018 -0.0080 -0.0015 -0.0050
Greece  1999Q1 -0.0151 0.0192 0.0052 -0.0020 -0.0099 0.0172
Ireland  1999Q1 0.0005 -0.0530 0.0066 -0.0260 0.0071 -0.0790
Italy  1999Q1 -0.0075 0.0030 0.0005 -0.0250 -0.0070 -0.0220
Luxembourg  1999Q1 -0.0044 -0.0040 0.0051 -0.0030 0.0007 -0.0070
The Netherlands  1999Q1 0.0025 -0.0280 0.0010 -0.0130 0.0036 -0.0410
Portugal  1999Q1 -0.0002 -0.0240 -0.0007 -0.0090 -0.0009 -0.0330
Spain  1999Q1 -0.0054 -0.0380 -0.0032 -0.0400 -0.0086 -0.0780
Note: 1. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are italicized. 
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Table 25 presents the Sacrfce Ratos for each country for the possble perods of dsnflaton. As seen n 
Table 2, the trade-off relatonshp s scarce n ths sample, and proper sacrfce ratos are not avalable for 
most countres. The fndngs suggest that dsnflaton has not been a major concern for polcymakers durng 
the ntroducton of the Euro probably wth the excepton of Greece.
Table 25: Sacrifice Ratios during the Adoption of Inflation Targeting
Country Euro Introduced in SR during the 3 
years Before IT
SR during the 3 
years After IT
Total Sacrifice Ratio
Austria  1999Q1 -2.28 (DLCPI↑, U↑) 6.56 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -0.62 (DLCPI↑, U↑)
Belgium  1999Q1 -3.16 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 7.11 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 37.85 (DLCPI↑, U↓)
Finland  1999Q1 10.90 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -13.27 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 22.35 (DLCPI↑, U↓)
France  1999Q1 -0.17 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 15.89 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -6.32 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Germany  1999Q1 0.93 4.57 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -3.40 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Greece  1999Q1 1.27 0.39 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 1.74
Ireland  1999Q1 101.34 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 3.94 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 11.08 (DLCPI↑, U↓)
Italy  1999Q1 0.40 47.26 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -3.15 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Luxembourg  1999Q1 -0.92 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 0.59 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 9.92 (DLCPI↑, U↓)
The Netherlands  1999Q1 11.15 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 12.49 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 11.54 (DLCPI↑, U↓)
Portugal  1999Q1 -98.36 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -12.93 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -35.11 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Spain  1999Q1 -7.04 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -12.52 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -9.08 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Notes: 1. Sacrifice ratio is computed as cumulative change in the unemployment rate divided by the cumulative change in  
 inflation (change in CPI) (Signs reversed).
 2. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
 italicized.  
Snce the ntroducton of the Euro tself has not resulted n dsnflatonary epsodes assocated wth 
unemployment sacrfce, Quarter 1, 1993 s agan consdered to dentfy possble dsnflatons.  Table 26 
presents the results. Dsnflatons had ndeed occurred n the 3-year perods surroundng 1993Q1, and when 
consdered the total change, dsnflatons coupled wth unemployment sacrfces have not happened only n 
Ireland and the Netherlands.
Table 26: Cumulative Changes in Inflation and Unemployment Before and 
After 1993Q1
Country During the 3 years Before 
1993Q1
During the 3 years After 
1993Q1
Total
DLCPI U DLCPI U DLCPI U
Austria 0.0016 0.0040 -0.0072 0.0000 -0.0055 0.0040
Belgium -0.0007 0.0050 -0.0045 0.0230 -0.0051 0.0280
Finland -0.0080 0.1040 -0.0094 0.0210 -0.0174 0.1250
France -0.0039 0.0150 0.0013 0.0090 -0.0026 0.0240
Germany -0.0015 0.0150 -0.0020 0.0130 -0.0035 0.0280
Greece 0.0099 0.0154 -0.0258 0.0106 -0.0160 0.0260
Ireland -0.0056 0.0160 -0.0027 -0.0360 -0.0083 -0.0200
Italy -0.0033 -0.0050 -0.0008 0.0220 -0.0040 0.0170
Luxembourg -0.0015 0.0040 -0.0045 0.0070 -0.0060 0.0110
The Netherlands 0.0018 -0.0080 -0.0017 0.0090 0.0001 0.0010
Portugal -0.0104 -0.0040 -0.0049 0.0260 -0.0153 0.0220
Spain -0.0041 0.0260 -0.0027 0.0210 -0.0068 0.0470
Note: 1. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are italicized.
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Usng the results n Table 25, sacrfce ratos can be computed for most countres (see Table 27). Durng the 
6-year perod surroundng 1993Q1, countres n the Euro Zone have experenced sacrfce ratos wthn a 
range from 0.7 to 9.3.  There s no evdence of an unemployment sacrfce only n relaton to Ireland and the 
Netherlands. 
Table 27: Sacrifice Ratios Before and After 1993Q1
Country SR during the 3 years 
Before 1993Q1
SR during the 3 years 
After 1993Q1
Total Sacrifice Ratio
Austria -2.45 (DLCPI↑, U↑) 0.00 0.72
Belgium 7.69 5.13 5.45
Finland 13.00 2.23 7.17
France 3.86 -6.86 (DLCPI↑, U↑) 9.32
Germany 10.32 6.48 8.10
Greece -1.56 (DLCPI↑, U↑) 0.41 1.63
Ireland 2.87 -13.16 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -2.41 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Italy -1.53 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 28.83 4.22
Luxembourg 2.73 1.56 1.85
The Netherlands 4.37 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 5.30 -7.63 (DLCPI↑, U↑)
Portugal -0.38 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 5.28 1.44
Spain 6.34 7.82 6.93
Notes: 1. Sacrifice ratio is computed as cumulative change in the unemployment rate divided by the cumulative change in  
 inflation (change in CPI) (Signs reversed).
 2. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
 italicized.
Table 28 shows that the standard devaton of nflaton has declned n all countres, and on average, the 
declne s by around 70 per cent. The standard devaton of unemployment has also declned n all countres 
except for Austra and Luxembourg, by around 8 per cent on average.
Table 28: Inflation and Unemployment Rate
Country Inflation (Per cent) Unemployment (Per cent)
Before EURO After EURO % Change Before EURO After EURO % Change
Austria 0.50 0.24 -51.34 0.62 0.63 0.58
Belgium 0.67 0.30 -54.55 1.38 0.78 -43.31
Finland 0.88 0.33 -62.11 4.55 0.83 -81.79
France 0.98 0.24 -75.32 1.62 0.63 -61.06
Germany 0.54 0.24 -55.95 1.69 0.89 -47.48
Greece 1.51 0.32 -78.69 1.39 0.97 -30.65
Ireland 1.45 0.47 -67.86 2.54 0.53 -78.93
Italy 1.24 0.14 -88.49 1.88 1.34 -29.14
Luxembourg 0.77 0.29 -62.55 0.55 1.17 114.22
The 
Netherlands
0.52 0.31 -39.65 1.44 0.85 -41.37
Portugal 1.89 0.30 -84.06 1.62 1.50 -7.25
Spain 1.00 0.33 -66.74 2.74 1.28 -53.39
Average 1.00 0.29 -70.48 1.84 0.95 -48.30
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5.3.2. Summary of Findings: Sub-sample 3
Ths sub-sample comprsng the Eurozone Countres show that the correlaton of nflaton and unemployment 
has declned after Euro (after 1999), However, much of the weakenng of ths correlaton has occurred 
between 1993-1998. Average nflaton has declned sgnfcantly after Euro whle average unemployment 
has also declned. However, there has been consderable dsnflaton durng 1993-1998 assocated wth 
ncreased unemployment durng the same perod. Compared wth 1993-1998, the post-Euro perod marks 
employment gans whch are hgher than dsnflaton gans. Chow breakpont tests reject trend breaks for 
nflaton processes at the tme of ntroducng the Euro. However, for several countres, ntroducton of the 
Euro has resulted n trend breaks n unemployment processes. Gradualsm s evdent throughout the pre-Euro 
perod as well. Employment sacrfce as shown by the slope of the Phllps curve relatonshp has flattened 
sgnfcantly for most countres, and the sacrfce ratos show that around the tme of ntroducton of the Euro, 
both nflaton and unemployment have declned for almost all countres suggestng no employment sacrfce 
has been made. However, sgnfcant employment sacrfces have occurred n dnsnflatonary epsodes 
between 1990 and 1996, wth sacrfce ratos around 0.7 to 9.3. 
5.4. Sub-Sample 4: Non-Inflation Targeting Countries 
Ths sample also serves as a comparator/control sample and ncludes Denmark, Russa, Japan, Swtzerland, 
and the USA. However, t must be noted that the behavour of nflaton and unemployment vares sgnfcantly 
among these fve countres, renderng aggregaton/averagng probably meanngless. Therefore, whenever 
possble, ndvdual countres n ths sub-sample are analyzed separately. To facltate comparson, the sample 
s dvded nto three tme perods as 1979Q-1992Q, 1993Q1-1998Q, and 1999Q1-2007Q1.
5.4.1. Measuring the Trade-off
a. Correlation between Inflation and Unemployment
Coeffcents of correlaton between nflaton and unemployment for the three sub-perods are provded 
n Table 29. On average, coeffcent of correlaton has declned over tme, but country experences vary 
hugely.
Table 29: Coefficients of Correlation : Inflation and Unemployment
Country (1979-1992) (1993-1998)  (1999-2007)
Denmark 0.0468 -0.2027 -0.2087
Japan -0.5711 -0.0506 -0.1557
Russia - -0.8627 -0.0175
Switzerland -0.0896 -0.1635 -0.1156
USA -0.1029 0.4501 -0.2220
Average -0.1792 -0.1659 -0.1439
Note: Russia’s inflation Series begins in 1992Q2 and unemployment series in 1991Q3.
Aggregated nflaton and unemployment for the countres n ths sub-sample durng the comparable 
1987Q1-200Q perod are provded n Fgure 5. There s no evdence of a trade-off between nflaton 
and unemployment, but on the contrary the two seres show a co-movement especally n the frst two sub-
perods.
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Snce aggregaton may result n perverse outcomes when country experences sgnfcantly dffer from each 
other, nflaton and unemployment for each country s plotted n Fgure 6. There has been a contnuous 
declne n nflaton n the frst two sub-perods whle nflaton seems to have stablzed n the thrd sub-perod. 
In Denmark and the USA, unemployment has declned snce 1993, whle n Japan, Russa and Swtzerland, 
unemployment has ncreased durng ths perod. A trade-off between nflaton and unemployment s vsble 
n the cases of Russa and Swtzerland.
Figure 5: Aggregated Data – Sub-sample 4
Quarterly Inflation and Unemployment - 
Non-Inflation Targeters
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Notes: 
1. DLCPI (Left axis)  is the average inflation for the 5 countries in the sub-sample.
2. U (Right axis) is the average unemployment for the same 5 countries.
3. Russia’s inflation Series begins in 1992Q2 and unemployment series in 1991Q3.
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Figure 6: Inflation, Unemployment and their Trends
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
D LC P ID E NMA RK S A
HP D LC P ID E NMA RK S A
UD E NMA RK S A
HP UD E NMA RK S A
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
D LC P IJA P A NS A
HP D LC P IJA P A NS A
UJA P A NS A
HP UJA P A NS A
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
D LC P IRUS S IA S A
HP D LC P IRUS S IA S A
URUS S IA S A
HP URUS S IA S A
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
D LC P IS W ITZE RS A
HP D LC P IS W ITZE RS A
US W ITZE RS A
HP US W ITZE RS A
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
D LC P IUS A S A
HP D LC P IUS A S A
UUS A S A
HP UUS A S A
b. Structural Breaks in Inflation and Unemployment 
Table 33 analyzes the changes n average nflaton and unemployment n the three sub-perods. On average, 
nflaton has declned by around 61.5 per cent (and around 60 bass ponts) wthn the frst two sub-perods, 
whle sgnfcant declnes n nflaton durng 1999-2007 perod have occurred only n Japan and Russa. The 
evdence on unemployment s not clear, but except for Japan, average unemployment has declned n all 
countres snce 1999.
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Table 30: Inflation and Unemployment Rate
Inflation (Per cent)
Country 1979-1992 1993-1998 % Change 1993-1998 1999-2007 % Change
Denmark 1.32 0.49 -63.22 0.49 0.53 8.23
Japan 0.59 0.19 -67.55 0.19 -0.11 -158.68
Russia - - - 22.00 4.02 -81.73
Switzerland 0.89 0.25 -71.93 0.25 0.23 -9.61
USA 1.20 0.61 -49.60 0.61 0.66 9.56
Average 1.00 0.39 -61.50 4.71 1.06 -77.38
Unemployment (Per cent)
1979-1992 1993-1998 % Change 1993-1998 1999-2007 % Change
Denmark 6.99 6.75 -3.32 6.75 4.74 -29.83
Japan 2.41 3.23 34.17 3.23 4.77 47.54
Russia - - - 2.47 2.05 -17.02
Switzerland 0.88 3.67 316.78 3.67 3.44 -6.39
USA 7.13 5.57 -21.86 5.57 4.98 -10.68
Average 4.35 4.81 10.40 4.34 3.99 -7.96
Note: Russia’s inflation Series begins in 1992Q2 and unemployment series in 1991Q3.
Results of the unvarate autoregressve functons and Chow Breakpont tests are provded below. Table 31 
summarzes the fndngs for Chow Breakpont tests wth the null hypothess of no structural break n 1993Q1 
for the nflaton processes. Accordngly, Japan and the USA show evdence of structural breaks n 1993Q1. 
Chow Breakpont tests for unemployment processes for 1993Q1 (see Table 32) suggest structural breaks for 
Denmark and the USA. 
Table 31: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Inflation Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag Length Constant Adj. R 
squared
Test for F-
Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood 
Ratio
[Prob.]
Denmark 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.6045 1993Q1 0.4408
[0.7788]
1.8903
[0.7559]
Japan 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.2938 1993Q1 3.4819
[0.0187]
10.5307
[0.0146]
Russia 1992Q4-
2007Q1
2 No 0.8398 1993Q1 - -
Switzerland 1980Q4-
2007Q1
3 No 0.5126 1993Q1 0.4970
[0.6852]
1.5687
[0.6665]
USA 1980Q3-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.3727 1993Q1 2.4177
[0.0707]
7.4207
[0.0596]
Mean
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Table 32: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Unemployment Processes
Country Regression Chow Breakpoint Test
Sample Lag 
Length
Constant Adj. R 
squared
Test for F-Statistic
[Prob.]
Log Likelihood Ratio
[Prob.]
Denmark 1982Q3-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9763 1993Q1 7.9678
[0.0006]
15.3522
[0.0005]
Japan 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 No 0.9892 1993Q1 0.8539
[0.4287]
1.7592
[0.4150]
Russia 1992Q1-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9851 1993Q1 0.5981
[0.6189]
1.9583
[0.5811]
Switzerland 1980Q3-
2007Q1
3 Yes 0.9933 1993Q1 1.4418
[0.2259]
6.0585
[0.1948]
USA 1980Q2-
2007Q1
2 Yes 0.9773 1993Q1 2.6481
[0.0529]
8.1002
[0.0440]
Tables 33 provdes the results of Chow Breakpont tests for the same unvarate autoregressve functons wth 
the test date of 1999Q1. The nflaton process for Japan ndcates a trend break n 1999Q1, whle the date 
marks structural breaks for unemployment processes n Denmark, Japan, and Russa.
Table 33: Chow Breakpoint Tests for Inflation and Unemployment Processes
Country Test for For Inflation Process For Unemployment Process
F-Statistic[Prob.] Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
F-Statistic[Prob.] Log Likelihood 
Ratio[Prob.]
Denmark 1999Q1 0.2214
[0.9259]
0.9535
[0.9168]
13.5634
[0.0007]
24.8670
[0.0000]
Japan 1999Q1 4.0377
[0.0093]
12.1197
[0.0070]
2.4582
[0.0905]
4.9885
[0.0826]
Russia 1999Q1 1.4710
[0.2387]
3.0769
[0.2147]
2.0114
[0.1230]
6.3503
[0.0958]
Switzerland 1999Q1 0.4440
[0.7220]
1.4027
[0.7049]
0.7323
[0.5720]
3.1201
[0.5379]
USA 1999Q1 1.4559
[0.2311]
4.5299
[0.2096]
0.5894
[0.6233]
1.8562
[0.6028]
 
c. Costs of Disinflation 
Table 3 summarzes the fndngs from the Inflaton-Unemployment scatter plots for tfve countres n the 
sub-sample. Before/After ratos for the slope are computed for the epsodes wth a trade-off.  The trade-off 
has lessened from 1979-1992 to 1993-1998 only for Japan, and from 1993-1998 to 1999-2007 only for 
Russa and Swtzerland.
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Table 34: Slope of Linear Regression Line of the Inflation-Unemployment 
Scatter Plot
Country Before 1993 
(1979-1992)
After 1993 
(1993-1998)
Before/After 
Ratio
Before 1999 
(1993-1998)
After 1999 
(1999-2007)
Before/After 
Ratio
Denmark 0.0024 -0.0173  -0.0173 -0.0746 0.23
Japan -1.1661 -0.0445 26.20 -0.0445 -0.0788 0.56
Russia - -19.8060  -19.8060 -0.1398 141.67
Switzerland -0.0674 -0.1815 0.37 -0.1815 -0.0353 5.14
USA -0.0584 0.1119  0.1119 -0.1110
Notes: 1. Scenarios where there is no trade-off are italicized.
Sacrfce ratos for possble epsodes of dsnflaton are computed usng changes n nflaton and unemployment. 
Table 35 nvestgates the changes n nflaton and unemployment around 1993Q1, the medan quarter of the 
poneerng nflaton targeters adoptng Inflaton targetng. Durng the 3-year perod pror to 1993Q1, nflaton 
has declned n all countres accompaned by ncreased unemployment. Durng the three years after 1993Q1, 
nflaton has declned n all countres except for Denmark. In the USA, the declne n nflaton has occurred 
wth declnng unemployment. Overall, there appears to be a trade-off between nflaton and unemployment 
around 1993Q1 (except for Denmark).
Table 35: Cumulative Changes in Inflation and Unemployment Around 1993Q1
Country During the 3 years Before 
1993Q1
During the 3 years After 
1993Q1
Total
DLCPI U DLCPI U DLCPI U
Denmark -0.0099 0.0210 0.0043 -0.0240 -0.0056 -0.0030
Japan -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0037 0.0107 -0.0060 0.0116
Russia -0.2874 0.0253 -0.2847 0.0253
Switzerland -0.0073 0.0290 -0.0079 0.0010 -0.0152 0.0300
USA -0.0026 0.0205 -0.0022 -0.0184 -0.0048 0.0021
Notes: 1. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
 italicized.
Table 36 presents the sacrfce ratos for each country for the possble perods of dsnflaton. Durng the 6-
year perod surroundng 1993Q1, the countres n ths sub-sample have experenced sacrfce ratos wthn a 
range of 0.09 to 7.87.
Table 36: Sacrifice Ratios Around 1993Q1
Country SR during the 3 years 
Before 1993Q1
SR during the 3 years 
After 1993Q1
Total Sacrifice Ratio
Denmark 2.13 5.63 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -0.53 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Japan 0.39 2.90 1.93
Russia - 0.09 0.09
Switzerland 3.97 0.13 1.98
USA 7.87 -8.43 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 0.44
Notes: 1. Sacrifice ratio is computed as cumulative change in the unemployment rate divided by the cumulative change in  
 inflation (change in CPI) (Signs reversed).
 2. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
 italicized.
 3. Slovak Republic’s and Turkey’s after IT sample has only 9 and 4 observation sets, respectively.
Table 37 dsplays the cumulatve changes n nflaton and unemployment durng the 3-year perods around 
1999Q1, the quarter n whch the Euro was ntroduced. Although all countres except for Japan have 
experenced fallng nflaton, t has been assocated wth fallng unemployment as well, ndcatng that there 
has been no employment sacrfce n these epsodes of dsnflaton. Table 38 computes the sacrfce ratos 
usng the data gven n Table 37
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Table 37: Cumulative Changes in Inflation and Unemployment around 1999Q1
Country During the 3 years Before 
1999Q1
During the 3 years After 
1999Q1
Total
DLCPI U DLCPI U DLCPI U
Denmark -0.0011 -0.0190 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0190
Japan 0.0117 0.0107 -0.0127 0.0094 -0.0011 0.0201
Russia 0.2074 -0.0052 -0.2950 -0.0112 -0.0876 -0.0164
Switzerland -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0050 -0.0034 -0.0070
USA -0.0005 -0.0114 -0.0043 0.0111 -0.0048 -0.0003
Notes: 1.    Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
 italicized.
Table 38: Sacrifice Ratios around 1999Q1
Country SR during the 3 years 
Before 1999Q1
SR during the 3 years 
After 1999Q1
Total Sacrifice Ratio
Denmark -17.48 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 0.00 -12.21 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Japan -0.92 (DLCPI↑, U↓) 0.74 18.89
Russia 0.03 (DLCPI↑, U↓) -0.04 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -0.19 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Switzerland -1.73 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -2.20 (DLCPI↓, U↓) -2.04 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
USA -22.89 (DLCPI↓, U↓) 2.59 -0.06 (DLCPI↓, U↓)
Notes: 1. Sacrifice ratio is computed as cumulative change in the unemployment rate divided by the cumulative change in  
 inflation (change in CPI) (Signs reversed).
 2. Counter-intuitive results (episodes where inflation and unemployment both falling, or inflation rising) are   
 italicized.
5.4.2. Summary of Findings: Sub-sample 4
For the non-Inflaton targetng, non-Eurozone Countres, the correlaton between nflaton and unemployment 
s negatve, but has not changed much over tme. There have been sgnfcant declnes n nflaton, but lower 
declnes n unemployment. The employment sacrfce, as shown by the nflaton-unemployment scatter plots 
has flattened over tme for most countres, ndcatng lower employment sacrfce. Sacrfce ratos dsplay 
that there has been substantal employment sacrfces durng 1990-1996 perod, but not so around 1999.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The precedng analyss attempts to capture any changes to nflaton and unemployment processes that have 
occurred as a result of Inflaton targetng. The study uses four sub-samples over the perod from 1980 to 
2007: two samples of explct Inflaton targetng and the other two beng non-Inflaton targetng (at least 
explctly) samples. 
The study conducts tme-seres analyses wthn each of the frst two sub-samples (nflaton targeters – ndustral 
countres and nflaton targeters – emergng market countres) to dentfy changes to the patterns of nflaton 
and unemployment resultng from Inflaton targetng. However, snce such changes could be common to 
non-Inflaton targetng countres as well, the control/comparator sub-samples are subjected to a smlar 
analyss. The frst comparator sub-sample comprses the countres n the Euro Zone. The second comparator 
sub-sample conssts of fve dverse non-Inflaton targetng countres that do not belong to the Euro Zone.  The 
Euro Zone countres are analysed to see whether the changes followng the creaton of the Euro (1999Q1) are 
smlar to those experenced by Inflaton targetng countres at the tme of adoptng Inflaton targetng. Also, 
another date, namely 1993Q1 s dentfed as the medan date of whch the poneerng Inflaton targetng 
countres adopted Inflaton targetng as ther monetary polcy framework. The Euro Zone countres are then 
tested to see whether 1993Q1 marks changes n nflaton and unemployment smlar to the countres n the 
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frst two sub-samples durng the tme of adoptng Inflaton targetng. The fourth sub-sample s nvestgated 
to dentfy smlar patterns n nflaton and unemployment both n 1993Q1 as well as n 1999Q1. 
Some general observatons are as follows:
1. The negatve correlaton between nflaton and unemployment has generally lessened over tme, 
suggestng a weakenng of the nflaton-unemployment trade-off. Ths s probably because of the 
hgher focus on nflaton stablsaton and lower emphass on employment stablsaton by most 
central banks, whch fxes nflaton at a certan level wth small boundares, yet employment s 
allowed to move n a broader range. 
2. The ntroducton of Inflaton targetng or the Euro has not resulted n sudden changes to nflaton 
processes n countres. Countres have generally preferred a gradualst approach n changes to 
monetary polcy frameworks. However, there s a sgnfcant trend-break n unemployment patterns 
followng the ntroducton of the Euro n Eurozone countres. 
3. Recent declnes n nflaton have not resulted n sgnfcant ncreases n unemployment n general. 
However, around the perods of dsnflaton, there have been employment sacrfces.  Also, n 
emergng market countres, there appears to be an ncreasng trend n unemployment under nflaton 
targetng, possbly due to the fact that these countres are attemptng to mantan a too-low rate of 
nflaton drvng unemployment above the natural level. 
Although arrvng at strct conclusons s dffcult, there are ndcatons that employment sacrfces have 
declned followng nflaton targetng especally n developed economes. The experence of some Eurozone 
economes as well as emergng market nflaton targeters shows that mantanng low and stable nflaton 
could lead to adverse unemployment outcomes. Whether slghtly hgher nflaton targets mght produce more 
favourable outcomes, needs further nvestgaton. 
For those economes that are yet to dsnflate and adopt nflaton targetng or smlar monetary polcy strateges 
that help mantan low and stable nflaton, areas of further research nclude; the choce of the nflaton 
target consderng output and employment outcomes; the mpact of the speed of dsnflaton, gven that 
gradualsm s the most common trend n monetary polcy regmes swtches; the mportance of credblty of 
monetary polcy as the probable key to reducng employment sacrfces arsng from dsnflatonary efforts; 
and, quantfyng the long-term benefts of dsnflaton as they may well offset the short-term costs assocated 
wth t. 
The broader message of ths paper s that n the quest for a vable nsttutonal framework to mantan low 
nflaton and stable prce levels, there s a need to convnce the publc that such an exercse s not costless n 
terms of output and employment losses as evdenced by the experences of the other countres. Also, authortes 
should attempt to mnmse these costs by consderng the mpact of gradualsm, the effect of greater polcy 
credblty, and the need to dentfy the approprate explct or mplct nflaton and employment targets to 
sut the partcular economy. 
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